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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction I ml i,- proper p U r s u a nt ^w w 
Code Annotated §78-2a-3(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1 . Did plaincitf I -• * I . \ i . 1 i 11> j i ''*f;«j <: > • i r:o t h e a d m i s s 1 o n 
of her prior personal injury lawsuit waive her right to object 
t o« * *-- -'Mi appeal ? 
PlaiHi-j.fi having tailed I'. object IM O1 ri deuce of her 
prior personal injury lawsuit, was obvious *i. Mi , . . i 1 
:o-\ "rrcr ~^v i~ ~ - <=?rc. a£f-ct 
the substantial ::^.i,? _. ,. 
„pj_a:j_n error,i r^rr,ir1r^na ti,ie plaintiff • v raise no., . ^  -ae 
on appeal? ^uai: . ui;jj^„, f -*. 
denied, 4 93 U.J" ; ' ' "• \ ;. 
io'l t:h^  t i ic ! court abuse its discretion by 
admitting evidence ie settlement of 
plaintiff's first lawsuit? 
The trial court has broad discretir: letermining the 
relevancy ui proiteieu «
 (M«IMJ - *- — fovrc if 
the trial court abused its discret-u. State \ , H^IZ-J, , f3 
P M I n ' i Utah 19 93) ., 
3 I"l the ev.;-., of the prior 
settlement was improperly admitted w-= . :_• >-/idence harmtuJ V 
- :i 
"For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a 
different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine 
confidence in the verdict." State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 232, 
citing State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence applies to this 
matter and is set forth in full in the Addendum of the 
Appellant's Brief. In relevant part, Rule 103 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence reads as follows: 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence 
(a) Defective erroneous ruling. Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party is affected and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling 
is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objeccion or motion to strike appears of 
record, stating the specific ground of 
objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; 
* * * 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought 
to the attention of the court. 
(Addendum 1) 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence applies to this 
matter and reads as follows: 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This litigation arose out of a May 12, 1993, automobile 
accident in which plaintiff Debra Larsen was rear-ended by a 
vehicle driven by defendant Melinda Johnson. Plaintiff alleged 
that as a result, she injured her back. Prior to this 
accident, however, plaintiff was involved in a more serious 
rear-end accident in which she suffered the same type of injury 
for which she brought suit against the defendant in this 
litigation and her claim in this litigation was that the 
accident with defendant aggravated her pre-existing injury. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case was tried to a jury beginning April 15, 1996, 
and continuing through April 17, 1996, before the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court. 
During the trial, evidence was introduced to show the 
nature and extent of plaintiff's prior injury following an 
automobile accident of November, 1988. Plaintiff was cross-
examined regarding symptoms experienced after her first rear-
end accident using a deposition taken in the course of the 
lawsuit stemming from the 1988 accident. In the course of that 
cross-examination, she was asked whether or not she had 
previously filed suit and no objection was raised. She was 
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subsequently asked to confirm that her first lawsuit was 
settled for $172,000 and her attorney objected to this on the 
basis of relevance. This objection was overruled. On re-
direct examination, the plaintiff explained how much she 
personally received after payment of medical expenses, 
attorney's fees and out of pocket expenses. 
On the afternoon of April 17, 1996, the case was 
submitted to the jury with an instruction regarding aggravation 
of a pre-existing injury (See Addendum 4). 
DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The jury unanimously found that the defendant was 
negligent but that defendant's negligence was not the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. The trial court entered a 
judgment for defendant based on the jury's verdict. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. This lawsuit arises out of a May 12, 1993, 
automobile accident in which a Subaru driven by defendant 
Melinda Johnson struck the rear end of a Suburban driven by 
plaintiff, Debra Larsen. (See R. 1-5, 377, 321). 
2. At the time of the accident, both plaintiff and 
defendant got out of their vehicles and looked for damages but 
could find none. (See R. 331, 391, 392). 
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3. When plaintiff returned home, however, her husband 
noticed damage to the rear bumper of the plaintiff's Suburban. 
(See R. 393). This damage was subsequently repaired for $45. 
(See R. 627) 
4. Plaintiff was involved in an earlier automobile 
accident in November of 1988 in which the vehicle in which she 
was riding as a passenger was rear-ended as the plaintiff was 
twisted in her seat. Plaintiff believed that the vehicle which 
struck her vehicle was traveling at 3 0 mph and the impact 
pushed the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding into the 
vehicle ahead. (See R. 362, 363 and 610). 
5. Following the accident of November, 1988, plaintiff 
suffered from more than four years of low back pain and 
underwent a lengthy course of treatment with numerous medical 
providers, multiple medical procedures and ultimately, in 
December of 1991, she underwent a two-level fusion at L4-5, L5-
Sl by Reed Fogg. (See R. 363, 364-368, 470-474, 516-521) 
6. Following plaintiff's fusion surgery in December, 
1991, she had a significant period of recovery with associated 
limitation of activities, periodic set-backs requiring 
injections of pain medication as she increased her activities, 
however, on March 30, 1993, a day after receiving $172,000 in 
settlement of her lawsuit associated with the 1988 accident, 
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Dr. Fogg found the plaintiff to be doing extremely well and 
released her from his care. (R. 442, 481, 482, 487, 488, 489, 
490, 522-524) 
7. Following plaintiff's fusion surgery in December, 
1991, plaintiff's treating physician stated that she would 
probably have a permanent impairment rating of approximately 
15% to 20%. (Addendum 2 - Trial Exhibit D-16, R. 529-531). 
8. Although plaintiff's treating physician stated that 
he attributed her back pain subsequent to the May, 1993, 
accident to that accident, he also testified that he did not 
know what the pain generator was for the plaintiff and could 
find no objective explanation of her pain. (R. 507, 533) 
9. Plaintiff's treating physician testified that 
plaintiff's pain pattern prior to the May, 1993 accident was 
very complex and made diagnosis very difficult. Following the 
May, 1993 accident, plaintiff's symptoms of back pain were not 
consistent nor does Dr. Fogg, her treating physician, know what 
the cause of the pain is as there is no objective indication of 
what that is. She is diagnosed as having chronic pain of 
undetermined etiology. (See R. 520, 532, 533) 
10. Plaintiff's treating physician also testified that 
subsequent to a fusion, some people subsequent to the surgery 
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do well for a period of time and then do poorly and then 
really never get well again. (R. 524, 525) 
11. Plaintiff's biomechanical and accident 
reconstruction expert, Dr. Paul France, testified that the 
force resulting from the May, 1993 rear-end impact alone was 
insufficient to cause her injury and that it was strictly the 
plaintiff's turning and rotating to try and catch her daughter 
who was falling from her standing position on the back seat 
which could have caused the plaintiff's injury. (See R. 568, 
569) 
12. Plaintiff testified at trial that after she felt 
the impact from defendant's vehicle striking her vehicle from 
behind and causing her to lean back and then forward in her 
seat, she turned to try and catch her young daughter who was 
falling off the back seat. She then just sat in her seat. 
(See R. 382, 388, 389, 450, 451, 456) 
13. Prior to trial, plaintiff testified in her 
deposition that after she felt the jolt from behind, her body 
went back and forward and that afterward, she sat there for 
what was either seconds or minutes. Plaintiff's explanation to 
defendant's representative prior to trial and to her own 
physician and to Dr. Nathaniel Nord, the physician who 
performed an independent medical examination on the plaintiff 
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was the same as that given at the time of her deposition, never 
mentioning the turning motion to catch her child. (See R. 447, 
448, 449, 453, 533, 534, 697) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff was involved in a serious automobile accident 
in November of 1988. Following that accident, she suffered 
from more than four years of back pain, was seen by numerous 
physicians, underwent multiple medical procedures and after a 
difficult period of time diagnosing the exact source of her 
pain, she underwent a two-level fusion performed by Dr. Reed 
Fogg in December of 1991. Following her fusion surgery, 
plaintiff was given a 15% to 20% permanent impairment rating. 
In the year following that surgery, she had a lengthy period of 
recovery with associated limitation of activities, periodic 
flare-ups of pain and treatment for pain. 
On March 29, 1993, the lawsuit which she filed as a 
result of the November, 1988 accident was settled for $172,000. 
The following day, she was seen by her physician who found her 
to be doing "extremely well" and released her from his care. 
On May 12, 1993, the plaintiff was involved in a minor 
rear-end accident. Following that, the condition of her back 
began to deteriorate until as of the time of trial, she 
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complained of constant back pain. Her physician was unable to 
find any objective indicator of the source of her back pain. 
The plaintiff's claim in this lawsuit is that the 
accident of May, 1993 lit up or aggravated the injuries which 
she sustained in the November, 1988 accident. At trial, 
evidence of the lawsuit which the plaintiff filed following the 
November, 1988 accident was admitted without objection from 
plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff's counsel did, however, object 
to the admission of the amount of the settlement of that 
lawsuit. 
Objection to the admission of evidence of the 
plaintiff's lawsuit for the permanent injuries she sustained in 
November, 1988 was waived and the requirements of "plain error" 
necessary to overcome the failure of plaintiff's counsel to 
object have not been met. Evidence of both the prior lawsuit 
and the amount of the settlement of that lawsuit is relevant 
to the plaintiff's claim that the 1993 accident aggravated or 
lit up her pre-existing condition and its admission is 
consistent with prior Utah case law and not an abuse of 
discretion constituting error. Even if the trial court erred 
in admitting this evidence, that error was harmless in light of 
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
In November of 1988, plaintiff was involved in a serious 
automobile accident. She was struck by a vehicle traveling at 
about 30 miles an hour while twisted in her seat. Following 
that accident in 1988, she underwent a course of more than four 
years of back pain, was seen by numerous physicians, underwent 
multiple medical procedures and after a difficult period of 
time diagnosing the exact source of her pain, she underwent a 
two-level fusion at L4-5, L5-S1 in December of 1991. This 
surgery was performed by Dr. Reed Fogg. Following that surgery 
in December of 1991, the plaintiff had a significant period of 
recovery with associated limitation of activities, periodic set 
backs regarding injections of pain medication as she increased 
her activities and according to her husband, required a full 
year for recovery from the December, 1991 surgery. 
She filed a lawsuit for the injuries sustained in the 
November, 1988, accident. Prior to the settlement of that 
lawsuit, she was given a 15% to 2 0% permanent impairment rating 
by Dr. Fogg, her treating physician. 
On March 30, 1993, the day after she received $172,000 
in settlement of the lawsuit associated with her 1988 accident, 
Dr. Fogg saw the plaintiff for the first time since November of 
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1992 when he had injected her with pain medication for a flare-
up of discomfort. When Dr. Fogg saw the plaintiff in March, he 
found her to be doing extremely well, releasing her from his 
care. 
On May 12, 1993, the plaintiff was involved in a minor 
rear-end collision in which the defendant's Subaru struck her 
Suburban at a low speed. Although no damage to either vehicle 
was noted at the scene of the accident, plaintiff's husband 
subsequently discovered that the plaintiff's Suburban was 
damaged and this was repaired at a cost of $45. 
The plaintiff claimed in the lawsuit pending before this 
Court that following this accident in May of 1993, her 
condition began to spiral downward causing her to undergo 
another surgery for removal of the hardware inserted at the 
time of the fusion and ultimately, as of the date of trial, to 
be in a state of constant low back pain. Although the 
plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Fogg, stated that he 
attributed plaintiff's current pain to the May, 1993 accident, 
he conceded that he was unable to determine the source of her 
current low back pain as there was no objective evidence of any 
pain generator. He further conceded that there are some 
patients who undergo the type of fusion surgery performed on 
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the plaintiff and who do well for a period of time and then 
start to do poorly and never do well again. 
Plaintiff's accident reconstruction and biomechanical 
expert, Dr. Paul France, testified that the forces from the 
rear-end impact alone would not have caused the plaintiff's 
injury. It was strictly the turning, twisting motion which the 
plaintiff described she made in order to attempt to catch her 
child from falling off the back seat. This testimony of 
plaintiff turning and twisting to catch her child was 
inconsistent with her deposition testimony, a prior statement 
made to defendant's representative, statements made to her 
treating physician, and a statement made to the independent 
medical examiner, Dr. Nathaniel Nord, less than one month prior 
to trial. 
POINT I. 
THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
PRIOR LAWSUIT AND SETTLEMENT WERE IN ACCORD 
WITH PRIOR UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
According to the provisions of Rule 103 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, a party may not base its claim of error on a 
ruling which either admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected and a timely 
objection to the ruling admitting evidence is made on the 
record, stating the specific ground of objection, if that 
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ground was not apparent from the context. If a timely 
objection to the ruling admitting evidence was not made, a 
claim of error may only be based on a ruling admitting the 
evidence which constitutes plain error affecting substantial 
rights. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied 493 U.S. 814, 110 S.Ct. 62, 107 L.Ed2d (1989) 
A. Plaintiff failed to object to the introduction of 
evidence of her prior lawsuit and the admission of said 
evidence does not constitute error, plain or otherwise. 
Plaintiff's counsel made no objection to the evidence of 
the introduction of evidence of the lawsuit following 
plaintiff's November, 1988, accident. Plaintiff's deposition 
given in connection with her prior lawsuit was used to point 
out an inconsistency with her testimony given at the time of 
trial. Beginning on page 425 of the Record, the following 
exchange took place: 
Q: (by Ms. Alcabes) Isn't it true that you 
actually felt pain from that accident within five 
minutes? 
A: Which accident is that? 
Q: The first accident we are talking about. 
A: Within five minutes? I don't recall that. 
Q: OK. Let me show you -- do you recall that 
there was a lawsuit that was filed as a result of 
that other accident; is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
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Q: Do you recall that as part of that lawsuit 
you had your deposition taken, in fact, on two 
occasions? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Do you recall when your deposition was taken 
you were placed under oath? 
A: That's also correct. ... 
R. 429 
Q: (by Ms. Alcabes) OK. Do you see in the 
middle of the page where you are asked, did you 
have any sensation of discomfort at that point 
right after the two impacts? What was your 
answer? 
A: I think it took a moment to register. 
Q: How about within five minutes after the 
impact? 
A: Oh, yes. Yes. 
(Addendum 3) 
No objection is made by plaintiff's counsel to this 
introduction of evidence of the prior lawsuit. In the middle 
of the discussion surrounding use of plaintiff's deposition 
from her prior lawsuit for purposes of showing that her trial 
testimony was inconsistent with prior deposition testimony, 
plaintiff's counsel objects that he has never seen this 
deposition before the date of trial, however, the Court states 
that this is not a legitimate objection. (See R. 428) 
Plaintiff is subsequently cross-examined using her deposition 
from the first lawsuit regarding a claim which she made in that 
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lawsuit concerning new symptoms of left foot and hand numbness. 
Sne claimed on direct examination in this trial that left leg 
and foot numbness were new symptoms never experienced prior to 
the May, 1993 accident. (R. 404, 443, 444) Again, no 
objection to use of the deposition from the first lawsuit is 
made. 
Inasmuch as an objection to evidence of the prior 
lawsuit was not made at the time of trial, objection to this 
evidence has been waived unless the admission of this evidence 
constitutes plain error. As stated by the Supreme Court in 
State v. Eldredge, Id. at 35, "the first requirement for a 
finding of plain error is that the error be fplain, ' i.e., 
from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that 
it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was 
committing error. . . . The second and somewhat interrelated 
requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error 
affects the substantial rights of the accused, i.e. that the 
error be harmful." 
In support of her claim that the error admitting 
evidence of the prior lawsuit (and settlement) was plain error, 
plaintiff reiterates her claim that "the fact of an amount of a 
prior settlement in an unrelated subsequent (sic) litigation is 
completely irrelevant to any issue to be tried... The error is 
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therefore, manifest. It would be plain to any court that the 
issue of a prior suit or settlement is not probative of any 
issue, nor will it assist the trier of fact to resolve any 
dispute before the trial court." Appellant's Brief at p. 10. 
Plaintiff offers no support for her contention that the court's 
decision to allow evidence of the prior lawsuit should have 
been obvious to the trial court and therefore, she fails to 
meet the first prong of the "plain error" requirement for 
raising objections to the admission of evidence not objected to 
trial. Moreover, she fails to demonstrate that absent the 
inclusion of this evidence, the verdict would have been 
different. Having failed to satisfy the "plain error" 
requirement, plaintiff has waived her right to object to the 
admission of evidence of her prior lawsuit. 
B. The admission of evidence of both the plaintiff's prior 
lawsuit and the amount of the settlement thereof did not 
constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the 
relevancy of proffered evidence and error will only be found if 
the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Wetzel, supra. 
The admission of evidence of both the prior lawsuit and the 
amount of the settlement thereof was relevant to whether the 
May, 1993 accident caused the injuries which plaintiff 
complained of in this lawsuit, was in accord with the Utah 
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Supreme Court decision in King v. Barron, 770 P. 2d 975 (Utah 
1985) and does not constitute an abuse of discretion on the 
part of the trial court. 
Plaintiff claims in this appeal that the admission of 
evidence of her prior lawsuit and the amount for which she 
settled that suit is irrelevant and therefore inadmissible and 
as such constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
It was, in fact, however, the plaintiff herself who introduced 
evidence of her prior accident and the resulting injuries. In 
fact, it was plaintiff's theory that the accident in this case 
aggravated or lit up her pre-existing injury. Jury instruction 
No. 24 submits plaintiff's theory of aggravation of her pre-
existing injury to the jury. 
A person who has a condition or disability 
at the time of an injury is not entitled to 
recover damages for that condition or disability. 
However, when a defendant's negligence aggravates 
or lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic 
condition, or one to which the injured person is 
predisposed, the defendant is liable to the 
injured person for the full amount of damages 
which ensue, notwithstanding such diseased or 
weakened condition. In other words, when a 
latent condition itself does not cause pain, but 
that condition plus an injury brings on pain by 
aggravation, the preexisting condition, then the 
injury, not the dormant condition, is the 
proximate cause of the pain and disability. A 
plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to recover all 
damages which actually and necessarily follow the 
injury. 
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This is true even if the person's condition 
or disability made the injured person more 
susceptible to the possibility of ill-effects 
than a normally healthy person would have been, 
and even if a normally healthy person probably 
would not have suffered any substantial injury. 
(See Addendum 4) 
The plaintiff refers to the case of King v. Barron, 770 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1988), in which the court held that in a limited 
context, a plaintiff could on redirect examination, introduce 
evidence of the settlement amounts received in suits arising 
out of prior injuries. The court in King did not address the 
issue of whether it is permissible for the defendant to 
disclose the amount of the settlement either through direct 
examination of his own witnesses or through cross-examination 
of the plaintiff. As noted by plaintiff in her brief, the 
court in King does note a prior decision from the state of 
Washington, Worthington v. Caldwell, 396 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1964) 
in which that court found that while the injuries sustained in 
a prior accident might be relevant to her present claim, the 
reference to the amount of the settlement of a prior lawsuit by 
a plaintiff was "not pertinent". The Utah Supreme Court in 
King simply said that they did not disagree with this analysis. 
The King court, however, then proceeded to distinguish 
the Worthington case from a case in which the prior accident 
and injury had already been injected into the trial. In a case 
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virtually identical to the present case and which the Utah 
court described as "well reasoned", a jury verdict in favor of 
the defendant was appealed by the plaintiff because of the 
admission of evidence of a prior settlement for an earlier 
injury. Kelsey v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 117 
N.W.2d 559 (1962). In the Kelsey case, the earlier injury was 
to the same area of the plaintiff's back as that claimed in the 
present injury, but the plaintiff asserted that the present 
accident had aggravated the prior injury, precisely the theory 
asserted by the plaintiff, Debra Larsen, in this case before 
the court. 
In King v. Barron, the Utah court cited the ruling of 
the Kelsey court that the introduction of the prior settlement 
is proper in a case where the trial court's instructions to the 
jury clearly submitted a claim by the plaintiff for aggravation 
of a pre-existing injury to her back, and quoted at length and 
with emphasis the Kelsey court's reasoning: 
In view of this, it was perfectly proper for 
defendant to bring out before the jury, in 
mitigation of that claim, the nature and extent 
of plaintiff's previous back injury. This would 
include the amount that he was paid in settlement 
therefor. What influence adverse to plaintiff 
this evidence may have had is indeed speculative 
since the jury need not have reached the question 
of damages. If there was any adverse influence, 
any such effect could have been diminished or 
erased if plaintiff had availed himself of the 
opportunity he had to explain the precise nature 
of his previous injury as well as the terms of 
the settlement. 
Kelsey, 117 N.W.2d at 563 (emphasis added by the Utah court in 
King at 770 P.2d 980) 
The plaintiff maintains that Kelsey does not stand for 
the proposition that a defendant may, without restriction, 
introduce irrelevant evidence of previous lawsuits and 
settlements. As pointed out by the King case, however, Kelsey 
does stand for the proposition that when the plaintiff claims 
aggravation of a pre-existing back injury, the defendant is 
entitled to bring before the jury, evidence of the nature and 
extent of the plaintiff's previous back injury, including the 
amount that she was paid in settlement. Any adverse influence 
can be erased by an explanation from the plaintiff of the 
nature of the injury and the terms of the settlement. 
Plaintiff, in fact, availed herself of the opportunity to 
explain the amount she personally received after paying all of 
her medical expenses, out of pocket expenses and attorney's 
fees. Rather than supporting the idea that the trial court's 
decision to allow evidence of a prior settlement would be an 
abuse of judicial discretion, the King case points to the idea 
that the absence of the opportunity for the defendant to 
present such evidence when the plaintiff is claiming 
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aggravation of a pre-existing injury is where the abuse would 
lie. See also Olson v. Hayes, 588 P.2d 68, 72 (Or. App. 1978) 
Plaintiff in this case suggests that the cases of Nepell 
v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1979), and Beil v. Mayer, 
789 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1990) are applicable to this case. It is 
unclear in the Nepell case, whether all of the injuries claimed 
by the plaintiff in his subsequent injury were identical with 
those claimed in his three earlier injuries, however, a divided 
court did hold that evidence of the amount of settlements for 
the plaintiff's prior injuries was error. It should be noted, 
however, that the three dissenting justices of the Iowa Supreme 
Court cited the case of Kelsey v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. case, 
supra, with approval asserting that the seriousness of the 
plaintiff's three prior injuries in that case was highly 
relevant in order to allocate the plaintiff's present problems 
between the prior injuries and the injuries claimed in the 
current lawsuit. The dissent pointed out that as the case 
before the court involved questions of causation and damages, 
the evidence of prior claims, settlements and awards was 
relevant. 
In the case of Beil v. Mayer, supra, cited by the 
plaintiff, no information is provided concerning whether the 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in either his first 
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accident or that subsequent to the one which he was suing for 
were the same injuries complained of in the lawsuit pending 
before the court. In fact, the basis for the defendant seeking 
to admit evidence of the settlement for the subsequent accident 
was that the plaintiff in the case pending before the court 
sought damages for future medical expenses and future lost 
wages and defendant believed that the jury ought to be aware of 
the amount awarded for the subsequent accident in order to 
calculate any damages for future lost wages and medical 
expenses resulting from the second in the series of three 
accidents. The court pointed out that once damages had been 
quantified, the trial court could deduct any damages for future 
injuries which were duplicated through separate awards for 
distinct injuries, if any. The defendant in Beil was concerned 
strictly with damages and the plaintiff recovering twice for 
future lost wages and future medical expenses and the court 
proposed a method for resolving this problem. The Beil case 
did not entail a situation in which a specific claim for 
aggravation of pre-existing injury was made. That claim 
submitted to the jury in the case before the Court poses 
questions of both damages and causation for the jury. 
Plaintiff is concerned that the introduction of evidence 
of the prior lawsuit and settlement is prejudicial to her since 
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it causes the jury to view the plaintiff in a negative light as 
someone who is litigious because she has sought the assistance 
of the court in the past. As indicated earlier, evidence of 
the prior lawsuit was not objected to by the plaintiff and the 
fact that she had, in fact, sought court assistance for 
resolution of her prior claims is not one which she may now 
complain of. 
The testimony in this trial and the plaintiff's medical 
records establish that since November, 1988, plaintiff had 
suffered from chronic back pain, sometimes better, sometimes 
worse. Although she had been released from Dr. Fogg's care on 
March 30, 1993, with a notation in his records that she was 
doing extremely well, she had prior to this been given a 15% to 
20% permanent impairment rating. According to Dr. Fogg, this 
impairment would not have increased after the May, 1993 
accident and may, in fact, have decreased due to different 
factors now used in the evaluation of permanent impairments. 
In the years after her first accident, plaintiff 
underwent numerous procedures, some helped for a short time, 
some did not. Diagnosis of the cause of her problem had been 
difficult with Dr. Fogg sending her to a physiatrist in 
California before performing the fusion surgery in December of 
1991. The plaintiff had an extended period of recovery from 
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that surgery, marked by extreme limitation of activity, 
periodic flare-ups of pain as she increased her activities and 
periodic injections of Toradol to treat those flare-ups. Dr. 
Fogg conceded at trial that there were patients who underwent 
the surgery which plaintiff did in December of 1991 who did 
well for a period of time and then who started to do poorly and 
just didn't get well again. 
After plaintiff's back pain returned following the minor 
accident of May, 1993, Dr. Fogg treated her conservatively, 
referring her for physical therapy. At some points, this 
helped, only to be followed by a return of her pain. He 
removed the hardware which had been placed in her back during 
the 1991 fusion surgery, admitting that some patients have a 
tissue reaction to the hardware as much as 2% years after the 
initial surgery (see R. 523) . Finally, he had no explanation 
for the source of her chronic back pain. He could identify no 
objective indication of the source of her pain (see R. 533). 
On March 29, 1993, the plaintiff received a serious 
settlement for the serious injuries she sustained in the 
November, 1988, accident. Evidence of the amount of this 
settlement, received the day before she was released from her 
doctor's care, would clearly be relevant to the jury's 
consideration of whether or not the back complaints the 
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plaintiff had at the time of trial were caused by the minor 
rear-end accident which occurred on May 12, 1993, or were 
merely a continuation of the permanent injuries she sustained 
in the more severe 1988 accident and the fusion surgery she 
underwent as a result of that accident and for which she had 
been compensated. 
Evidence of the amount of plaintiff's earlier settlement 
of claims for injuries to the same part of her body as 
complained of in this lawsuit following the second accident is 
relevant in that it has a tendency to make the existence of a 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of this action 
more probable or less probable than it would without the 
evidence. (Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence) In this case in 
which the plaintiff's claim was that of an aggravation of a 
pre-existing injury, the court was well within its discretion 
by admitting the amount of the settlement of plaintiff's prior 
lawsuit in which she claimed that as a result of the 1988 
accident, she suffered more than four years of back pain, 
underwent numerous procedures, major surgery and for which she 
was given a permanent impairment. The compensation she 
received for that permanent injury was entirely relevant to 
whether or not the May, 1993 accident aggravated or lit up 
plaintiff's prior injury or whether the pain which she 
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experienced after the May, 1993 accident was a result of the 
permanent injuries she sustained in November, 1988. 
POINT II. 
INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
PRIOR LAWSUIT AND THE SETTLEMENT 
THEREOF WAS HARMLESS. 
The admission of the evidence of plaintiff's prior 
settlement, the introduction of which plaintiff did object to, 
and of her prior lawsuit, which plaintiff did not object to, 
was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. However, 
even if the court finds that the introduction of the amount of 
the settlement was an abuse of discretion, in order for this 
error to require reversal, "the likelihood of a different 
outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
the verdict". State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) 
"The more evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely 
there was harmful error." Id. at 24 0. 
Although the jury in this case found that the defendant 
was negligent, they unanimously found that any negligemce on 
the part of the defendant did not proximately cause the 
plaintiff's injuries. Of significance to this verdict is the 
fact that the plaintiff's own biomechanical and accident 
reconstruction expert, Dr. Paul France, testified that the rear 
end impact in this case in which the defendant's Subaru struck 
the plaintiff's Suburban causing $45 worth of damage to the 
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Suburban would not have caused injury to the plaintiff. (R. 
568, 569) Dr. France testified that it was strictly the 
plaintiff's twisting rotational movement at the time of the 
impact which could have caused the injury of which she now 
complained (this, although even the plaintiff's treating 
physician was unable to identify the cause of the plaintiff's 
current discomfort.) (R. 569) 
Although plaintiff testified at trial that subsequent to 
the impact, after going back against her seat and then forward, 
she instinctively turned to try and catch her young child who 
had been standing on the back seat, four earlier versions of 
the accident related by the plaintiff did not include this 
information. On cross-examination, it was pointed out that 
plaintiff did not indicate this in her deposition nor did she 
indicate this in a statement she gave, and at which her 
attorney was present, to a representative of defendant. Both 
in her deposition and in her statement to defendant's 
representative, she indicated that after she was struck, she 
just sat in her seat, making no mention of having turned to 
catch her child. 
Plaintiff also made no such indication of a rotational 
movement to her own physician, Dr. Reed Fogg, and Dr. Fogg 
himself testified that he just learned of that motion on the 
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part of the plaintiff following impact on the Friday before 
trial when talking with the plaintiff's counsel. (R. 533, 534) 
Dr. Nathaniel Nord, who conducted an independent medical 
examination on the plaintiff on March 26, 1996, less than one 
month before trial, also indicated that he had not been told by 
the plaintiff that she instinctively rotated to her right in an 
effort to catch her child following impact. (R. 694, 697) 
There was also evidence at trial from defendant's expert 
Dr. Tom Blotter, that the force of the impact from defendant's 
Subaru striking plaintiff's Suburban would have been 
insufficient to have "thrown" plaintiff's four year old child 
off the back seat on which she was standing. Dr. Blotter 
testified that the nature of the force would have caused the 
plaintiff's child to go back against the back seat cind not 
forward. (R. 668, 669) 
Dr. Paul France indicated that he had not, in fact, even 
spoken with the plaintiff until the week prior to trial. (R. 
566) Dr. France further testified that his investigation 
indicated that at the time of the collision, the defendant's 
vehicle was not pitching forward as it might if she had been 
involved in rapid deceleration. (R. 571 and 572) 
In any event, the uncontroverted evidence in this case 
was that the rear-end collision alone would not have injured 
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the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff did testify at trial 
that following impact, she attempted to reach for her child, 
this testimony differed from that which she had given on four 
other occasions, including that given to her own treating 
physician. The version of what she did following impact, that 
is, after going back and forth in her seat, instinctively 
turning to try and catch her child and then sitting for seconds 
or minutes, denying that the accident actually took place 
defies logic. One second she is instinctively coming to her 
child's assistance and the next, she is sitting in her seat in 
a state of denial and shock rather than assisting her child off 
the floor. 
Also of significance is the fact that from the date of 
the plaintiff's first accident in November of 1988, she 
underwent a tortured course of back pain, the cause of which 
was difficult to diagnose and ultimately, a two level fusion in 
December of 1991. (R. 516-521) Her husband testified that it 
was a year after that December, 1991 fusion surgery before his 
wife recovered from the surgery and could resume her 
activities. (R. 620) Dr. Fogg admitted that the plaintiff's 
recovery was somewhat longer than other patients, however, her 
pain syndrome had always been complex. 
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While his notes of March 30, 1993, indicate that 
plaintiff was doing extremely well, Dr. Fog^ had already 
assigned the plaintiff between a 15% to 20% permanent 
impairment rating as a result of her injuries sustained in the 
first accident. He fully conceded that some individuals who 
underwent the type of surgery which the plaintiff did in 
December of 1991, would do well for a period of time and then 
suddenly not do well and never do well again. Plaintiff's 
symptomatology, the fact that as of the date of trial, Dr. Fogg 
had no explanation for her pain and could find no objective 
source of her discomfort and the fact that she had prior to 
being involved in the second accident been given a 15% to 20% 
permanent impairment rating indicates that her course following 
the second accident was consistent with her course of back pain 
ebbing and flowing from the date of the November, 1988 
accident. If the court does find that the admission of the 
amount of the plaintiff's first settlement was an abuse of 
discretion, the likelihood of a different outcome because of 
this error is minimal. 
In this case, given the uncontroverted testimony that 
the rear-end impact alone could not have caused injury to the 
plaintiff, and the fact that the plaintiff never mentioned a 
twisting movement following impact in the two statements which 
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she made under oath and the statements which she made to Dr. 
Fogg, her treating physician, and Dr. Nord, less than one month 
before trial all support the jury's verdict that defendant's 
negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
Although the plaintiff claims she was never asked if she 
turned to catch her child, she was asked what she did after 
impact and responded "I just sat there". 
Moreover, her consistent course of some improvement 
followed by set backs throughout the period of time from the 
November, 1988 accident, the fact that she was assigned a 
permanent impairment rating following that accident, the fact 
that her treating physician could find no basis for her low 
back pain subsequent to the second accident, and finally, the 
fact that her physician admitted that some individuals who 
underwent back fusions did well for a period of time and then 
stopped doing well supports the jury's verdict in this case 
that the negligence of the defendant in bumping into the 
plaintiff's Suburban was not the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's back injuries. If the admission of the amount of 
the plaintiff's settlement of her prior lawsuit were erroneous 
and not admitted, the likelihood of a different outcome in this 
case, considering the other evidence on causation and the 
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course of the plaintiff's back pain since November of 1988, 
would not have resulted in a different outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision to admit evidence of the 
amount of the settlement of the plaintiff's prior lawsuit is 
consistent with prior Utah case law and was not an abuse of 
discretion. The admission of the fact that plaintiff had filed 
a prior lawsuit was not objected to by plaintiff at trial and 
the admission thereof was not plainly erroneous. Given the 
evidence that the rear-end impact in this case could not have 
injured the plaintiff and the fact that plaintiff's testimony 
at trial that she turned to try and catch her child following 
impact was inconsistent with the version of the accident which 
she provided on four other occasions and the up and down 
history and difficulty in diagnosing the source of plaintiff's 
back pain since November of 1988 render the admission of the 
amount of the settlement and the lawsuit, if erroneous, 
harmless. , 
DATED this y r7 day of September, 1997. 
HANSON, NELSON ,>CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY C2 
Attorneys for Defende(nt/Appellee 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 103 
ARTICLE L 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
gule 101. Scope. 
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and 
^ith the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. 
advisory Committee Note. — Adapted Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in 
&0Q Rule 101, Uniform Rules of Evidence courts of the state including situations previ-
0*74). Rule 1101 contains exceptions dealing ously governed by statute, except to the extent 
jKb preliminary questions of fact, grand jury that specific statutory provisions are expressly 
proceedings, miscellaneous judicial or quasi-ju- retained. Rule 101 also rejects Lopes v. Lopes, 
jjcUl proceedings and summary contempt pro- 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.2d 687 (1974) to the 
endings. Rule 101 and HOI are comparable to
 e x t e n t ^^ i t permits ad hoc development of 
Bale 2 of the Utah Rulea erf Evidence (1971), ^ ^
 o f ^ inconsiBtent ^ih these 
n q * that Rule 2 made applicable other pro-
 R u l e g rf E v i d e n c e . 
^Evidence. In addition, Rule 2 of the Utah ***P** 164 (Utah 1978) that statutoryj>r<m. 
Roles of Evidence (1971) expressly made the *°™ of evidence law inconsistent with the 
roles applicable to both civil and criminal pre- rules will take precedence is rejected. 
cee<iing8. Cross-References. — Evidence generally, 
Rule 101 adopts a general policy making the 5 78-25-2 et seq.; Rule 43, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Bail hearings. Chynoweth v. Larson, 572 P.2d 1081 (Utah 
The former Utah Rules of Evidence were ap- 1977). 
plicable to and controlling at bail hearings. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- Biased Evidence Rules: A Framework for Ju-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68. dicial Analysis and Reform, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part II, 1987 67. 
Utah L. Rev. 467. 
Rule 102, Purpose and construction. 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 102 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is an adjuration 
as to the purpose of the Rules of Evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986); State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments Utah Rules of Evidence 1983 — Part EI, 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 130. 1995 Utah L. Rev. 683. 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
(1) Objection* In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground 
of ohrjection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. 
Rule 103 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 55* 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or farther 
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making 
of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the 
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or oflers of proof 
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors 
affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of 
the court. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 103 is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is in conformity 
with Rules 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and Utah case law not involving constitutional 
considerations. Subsection (a)(1) is in accord 
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
and Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 Utah 2d 
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). See also Bradford v. 
Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); 
ANALY8I8 
Applicability. 
Bench trial. 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
—Exclusion. 
—Harmless error. 
—Objection. 
—Offer of proof. 
—Substantial right or prejudice. 
—Waiver. 
Plain error. 
Purpose. 
Cited. 
Applicability. 
Adequacy under Subdivision (a)(2) of plain-
tiffs proffer of expert testimony was irrelevant 
where the trial court's exclusion of the testi-
mony was a case management decision and the 
substance of the testimony had no bearing on 
the court's decision, because the exclusion of 
testimony was not an evidentiary ruling to 
which Subdivision (a)(2) would apply. Berrett 
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). 
Bench trial 
When a trial is to a court, the rulings on 
evidence are not of such critical moment as 
when a trial is to a jury, because it is to be 
assumed that the court has, and will use, its 
superior knowledge as to competency and the 
effect which should be given evidence. Super 
Tire Mkt., Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417 
P.2d 132 (1966). 
Erroneous rulings. 
—Cumulative evidence. 
Even if refusal to admit photographs was 
error, no prejudice resulted to defendant where 
the evidence was cumulative and could have 
added nothing to defendant's case. Godeaky v. 
Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). 
Szarak v. Sandoval, 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 
1981). Rule 103(d) is a restatement of the plain 
error rule. See Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) and State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). 
Croaa-References. — Harmless error in ad-
mission or exclusion of evidence, Rule 61, 
U.R.C.P. 
—Exclusion. 
When evidence is excluded by trie trial court, 
any error which may have resulted from such 
exclusion is cured when the substance of the 
evidence is later admitted through some other 
means. State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d 586 (Utah 
1983). 
—Harmless error. 
Where there was no likelihood that the testi-
mony in question had any substantial bearing 
on the outcome of the trial, it was not a cause 
for reversal. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., 20 
Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968). 
Admission of hearsay testimony connecting 
defendant with the crime was not prejudicial 
where there was other testimony connecting 
the defendant to the crime adduced before the 
hearsay testimony. State v. Gardunio, 652 P.2d 
1342 (Utah 1982). 
The improper admission of hearsay evidence 
w&s harmless error where the exclusion of such 
evidence was not likely to produce a different 
result. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 
(Utah 1982). 
Denial of a defendant's motion to suppress 
certain identification evidence was not a ruling 
upon which error can be predicated where 
there was other ample evidence of the defen-
dant's culpability. State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 
753 (Utah 1985). 
Trial court's error in restricting defense 
counsel's cross-examination of the prosecu-
tion's key witness concerning bias was harm-
leas, where the jury had sufficient information 
to fully appraise the witness's biases and moti-
vations. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 
1987). 
Admission of improper impeachment evi-
dence was not prejudicial error, where the tes-
timony did not bear directly on whether defen-
dant did or did not do any of the acts witl 
which he was charged, and there was no indi 
cation that the testimony improperly influ 
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April 21, 1992 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
One Utah Centre 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Attn: Derrick Langton 
RE: Debra C. Larsen 
Dear Mr. Langton: 
It is my medical opinion that most likely Ms. Debra Larsenfs 
present complaints and surgery were related to an internal disc 
disruption occurring in the 11/05/88 automobile accident. At the 
present time Debra is doing well postoperatively. I believe at 
this point that her prognosis is good. She probably will have a 
partial permanent impairment rating of approximately 15 to 20%. 
If you have any further questions regarding this patient, please 
feel free to contact my office. 
Sincerely, 
^ArwflAiiD. 
Reed Fogg, M.D. 
KD/bg 
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Tab 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
ACTUALLY FELT PAIN FROM THAT ACCIDENT WITHIN FIVE MINUTES? 
A WHICH ACCIDENT IS THAT? 
Q THE FIRST ACCIDENT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT. 
A WITHIN FIVE MINUTES? I DON'T RECALL THAT. 
Q O^AY. LET ME SHOW YOU — DO YOU RECALL 
THAT THERE WAS A LAWSUIT THAT WAS FILED AS A RESULT OF THAT 
OTHER ACCIDENT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND DO YOU RECALL THAT AS PART OF THAT 
LAWSUIT YOU HAD YOUR DEPOSITION TAKEN, IN FACT, ON TWO 
OCCASIONS? 
12 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Q DO YOU RECALL THAT WHEN YOUR DEPOSITION WAS 
TAKEN YOU WERE PLACED UNDER OATH? 
A THAT'S ALSO CORRECT. 
MS. ALCABES: YOUR HONOR, MAY I PUBLISH A DEPOSI-
TION OF MAY 30TH, 1991? 
MR. PLANT: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE A DIFFICULTY IN 
THAT IT'S NOT TAKEN IN THIS CASE. I DON'T THINK THAT'S 
APPROPRIATE TO PUBLISH IT. IF IT IS AN INCONSISTENT STATE-
MENT, SO BE IT, BUT IT IS NOT A DEPOSITION — 
THE COURT; WHAT DO YOU INTEND TO VSE IT FOR, MS. 
23 I ALCABES? 
24
 MS. ALCABES: FOR IMPEACHMENT. 
25
 THE COURT: ON SOMETHING SHE'S ALREADY TESTIFIED 
000426 
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1
 TO? 
2
 MS. ALCABES: RIGHT. 
3
 THE COURT: WELL, I DON'T KNOW THAT I CAN PUBLISH 
4 THAT IF IT WASN'T TAKEN IN THIS CASE. IF YOU HAVE A PRIOR 
5 SWORN STATEMENT THEN — 
6
 MS. ALCABES: I REALLY WANT TO JUST GET HER TO 
7 TAKE A LOOK AT IT AND READ THE RESPONSE. 
8
 THE COURT: I THINK YOU CAN USE IT FOR THAT 
9 PURPOSE, BUT IF YOU HAVE A PRIOR DEPOSITION, LAY THE FOUN-
10 DATION FOR IT. YOU CAN CERTAINLY ASK HER TO READ PART OF 
11 IT. 
12 Q (BY MS. ALCABES) WOULD YOU MIND TURNING TO 
13 PAGE 15 OF THAT DEPOSITION? 
14 MR. PLANT: YOUR HONOR, I AM GOING TO OBJECT. 
15 I'VE NEVER SEEN THIS DEPOSITION BEFORE. I WAS NOT THERE. 
16 IT'S NOT TAKEN IN THIS CASE. I DON'T KNOW WHAT'S GOING ON. 
17 I JUST THINK IT IS INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
18 THE COURT: MS. ALCABES, YOU CAN USE THE DEPOSI-
19 TION IF THERE IS AN INCONSISTENT STATEMENT, BUT I HAVEN'T 
20 HEARD AN INCONSISTENT STATEMENT. YOU NEED TO ASK THE 
21 WITNESS THE QUESTION AND IF SHE ANSWERS IN A FASHION THAT 
22 YOU THINK IS CONTRARY TO WHAT SHE'S TESTIFIED TO BEFORE, 
23 YOU MAY USE IT, BUT YOU CAN'T USE IT THE SAME WAY THAT YOU 
24 COULD FOR TAKING A DEPOSITION IN THIS CASE FOR ANY PURPOSE. 
25 SO I GUESS YOU GOT TO ASK THE QUESTION AND IF YOU 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THINK THERE IS A DIFFERENT ANSWER HAVE HER READ THE ANSWER 
IN HER PRIOR SWORN STATEMENT. 
HAVE WE REACHED THAT POINT? 
MS. ALCABES: I THINK WE HAVE. 
THE COURT: HAS SHE GIVEN YOU AN ANSWER THAT YOU 
THINK IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR DEPOSITION TESTIMONY? 
MS. ALCABES: I'M SORRY, YES. 
Q (BY MS. ALCABES) I'M LOOKING NOW ON PAGE 
15. I'M AT ABOUT LINE FOUR AND YOU WERE ASKED AT THAT 
TIME, DID YOU HAVE A SENSATION OF DISCOMFORT AT THAT MOMENT 
RIGHT AFTER THE TWO IMPACTS. 
MR. PLANT: AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T MEAN TO 
GET IN THE WAY, BUT THIS IS UNUSUAL, IN THAT I'VE NEVER 
EVEN SEEN THIS, I DON'T KNOW THE CONTEXT, I AM NOT ABLE TO 
REHABILITATE BECAUSE I'VE NEVER SEEN THIS DEPOSITION BEFORE 
TODAY. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK THAT IS A LEGITIMATE 
OBJECTION. 
MR. PLANT: WELL, THE PROBLEM IS — 
THE COURT: IT IS A LEGITIMATE CONCERN. 
MR. PLANT: IF IT WERE IN THIS CASE I, AT LEAST, 
WOULD HAVE BEEN HERE. I DON'T KNOW WHAT SHE IS TALKING 
ABOUT. 
THE COURT: APPARENTLY, YOUR CLIENT MADE A PRIOR 
STATEMENT UNDER OATH. IF THAT'S AN OBJECTION IT'S OVER-
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1
 RULED. 
2
 YOU MAY PROCEED. 
3
 Q (BY MS. ALCABES) OKAY. DO YOU SEE IN THE 
4
 MIDDLE OF THE PAGE WHERE YOU WERE ASKED, DID YOU HAVE ANY 
5
 SENSATION OF DISCOMFORT AT THAT POINT RIGHT AFTER THE TWO 
6
 IMPACTS? WHAT WAS YOUR ANSWER? 
7
 A I THINK IT TOOK A MOMENT TO REGISTER. 
8
 Q HOW ABOUT WITHIN FIVE MINUTES AFTER THE 
9
 I IMPACT? 
A OH, YES. YES. 
Q OKAY. CAN WE HAVE — 
12 A BUT THAT'S REGARDING THE SENSATION, NOT 
13 PAIN. 
14 THE COURT: JUST A MOMENT, MS. LARSEN. JUST 
15 ANSWER THE QUESTION. 
16 ASK YOUR NEXT QUESTION. 
17 Q (BY MS. ALCABES) WAS THE QUESTION — GO 
18 BACK TO LINE 14. DID YOU HAVE ANY SENSATION OF DISCOMFORT 
19 THAT MOMENT RIGHT AFTER THE TWO IMPACTS? IS THAT WHAT THE 
20 QUESTION SAYS? 
21 A THAT'S CORRECT. 
22 Q OKAY. DID THE POLICE INVESTIGATE THAT 
23 OTHER ACCIDENT? 
2 4
 I A YES, THEY DID. 
Q OKAY. IS IT TRUE THAT AFTER THAT OTHER 25 
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Tab 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. <3*{ 
A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an 
injury is not entitled to recover damages for that condition or 
disability. However, when a defendant's negligence aggravates or 
lights up a latent, dormant, or asymptomatic condition, or one to 
which the injured person is predisposed, the defendant is liable to 
the injured person for the full amount of damages which ensue, 
notwithstanding such diseased or weakened condition. In other 
words, when a latent condition itself does not cause pain, but that 
condition plus an injury brings on pain by aggravation, the 
preexisting conditipn, then the injury, not the dormant condition, 
is the proximate cause of the pain and disability. A plaintiff, 
therefore, is entitled to recover all damages which actually and 
necessarily follow the injury. 
This is true even if the person's condition or disability made 
the injured person more susceptible to the possibility of ill-
effects than a normally healthy person would have been, and even if 
a normally healthy person probably would not have suffered any 
substantial injury. 
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